Hungary’s presidency has entered a new phase after President Tamás Sulyok signed a constitutional amendment ending his own term, clearing the way for the government of Prime Minister Péter Magyar to accelerate its effort to reshape state institutions following its landslide election victory in April. The move marks one of the most consequential constitutional changes since the transfer of power from Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, which governed Hungary for 16 years before losing office.
The immediate significance extends beyond the departure of the head of state. Although Hungary’s presidency is largely ceremonial, the office has served as an important constitutional safeguard through its authority to review legislation, refer laws to the Constitutional Court, and represent institutional continuity. Removing a sitting president through constitutional amendment rather than resignation underscores the determination of the new administration to dismantle structures it argues were built to preserve the influence of the previous government. At the same time, critics contend that using constitutional power in this manner raises questions about precedent and the future balance between political majorities and institutional independence.
The government has justified the amendment by arguing that Sulyok, elected in 2024 by lawmakers from Orbán’s Fidesz party, no longer enjoyed public confidence and remained closely associated with the previous administration. Magyar has consistently argued that many senior officeholders appointed during Orbán’s tenure continued to occupy positions designed to outlast electoral change, limiting the ability of a newly elected government to implement its mandate. The constitutional amendment therefore forms part of a broader institutional restructuring rather than an isolated personnel decision.
Sulyok accepted the legal consequences of the amendment and signed the legislation but publicly criticized the process. He argued that ending the mandate of a sitting president through constitutional amendment weakened democratic principles and the rule of law. His response reflects one of the central debates surrounding Hungary’s political transition: whether rapid institutional change is necessary to restore democratic accountability or whether such methods risk reproducing the concentration of power they are intended to replace.
The constitutional package reaches well beyond the presidency. It introduces a 12-year limit on parliamentary service, establishes a mandatory retirement age for Constitutional Court judges, creates new mechanisms aimed at recovering public assets, and removes or restructures several institutions established during the Orbán era. Government officials describe these measures as restoring checks and balances after years of centralized rule, while opponents argue that the pace and breadth of reform require careful scrutiny to ensure that institutional independence is preserved.
The reforms must also be understood against the backdrop of Hungary’s political evolution over the past decade and a half. During Orbán’s premiership, Fidesz repeatedly used its parliamentary supermajority to amend the constitution, reshape the judiciary, alter electoral rules, and expand political influence over public institutions. European Union institutions, international organizations, and legal scholars frequently raised concerns about judicial independence, media freedom, and anti-corruption safeguards. Magyar’s government argues that reversing many of those constitutional arrangements requires equally extensive legislative action because the previous system embedded political appointments with long terms extending beyond normal electoral cycles.
The political implications extend beyond Hungary. Budapest’s relationship with the European Union became increasingly strained during Orbán’s administration over rule-of-law disputes and governance standards. Since taking office, Magyar has signaled an intention to rebuild relations with European partners, strengthen anti-corruption mechanisms, and pursue institutional reforms intended to address longstanding EU concerns. Whether these changes ultimately improve Hungary’s standing will depend not only on legislative outcomes but also on how new institutions operate in practice and whether independent oversight is demonstrably strengthened.
Domestically, the transition illustrates both the opportunities and risks that accompany a government holding a strong constitutional majority. The same parliamentary powers that enabled Orbán’s governments to reshape Hungary’s political system now allow his successors to reverse many of those changes. Constitutional scholars often note that durable democratic institutions depend not only on electoral mandates but also on broadly accepted rules governing the exercise of power. Consequently, observers are likely to assess not simply the content of the reforms but also the procedures through which they are implemented.
The immediate constitutional transition is now underway, with Parliament Speaker Ágnes Forsthoffer due to assume the role of interim president while parliament prepares to select a successor under the amended framework. The government continues to advance plans for a broader constitutional overhaul, while opposition figures, including Orbán, have condemned the reforms as an abuse of parliamentary power. The confirmed situation therefore reflects both a decisive consolidation of authority by Hungary’s new government and the beginning of a wider institutional transformation whose legal, political, and international consequences will be measured through the implementation of future reforms and the response of domestic institutions and European partners.
